Qatar Against The Blockade
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INTRODUCTION:

The unjust and surprising Qatar blockade may be considered the most important event in the country's contemporary history, given its essential political, economic and social impacts on Qatar’s present and future. After that the “Qatari ship” has successfully overcome the storm, it is now necessary to consider the ensuing challenges and opportunities that would shape the new Qatar. Therefore, Qatar University, represented by SESRI, engaged in conducting a comprehensive national study using the most accurate scientific research methodologies to explore Qataris’ political, economic and social attitudes towards the developments resulting from the crisis, and draw the main conclusions to provide recommendations to decision makers in Qatar.

The present report outlines the results of dozens of carefully selected indicators and compares them with previous results, if any, to explore the crisis impact on Qataris’ views and perceptions. The report is divided into 5 parts as follows:

- The Legal Implications
- The Political Implications
- The Economic Implications
- The Social Implications
- Implications on Human Development

This report summarizes the main findings of the study. The data collected will undoubtedly constitute information wealth that will be built upon in the next phases, particularly in documenting the social, economic and political transformations in the Qatari society due to local and regional events, especially the Qatar Blockade.

The Survey Team
1. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS:

In the recent events in the Gulf, it was obvious that the decisions made by KSA, UAE, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Arab Republic of Egypt to impose a blockade on Qatar, cut ties and close air, sea and land entry points, were taken only by leaders at the very top of the power hierarchy in these States. In other words, the people of these countries did not participate in taking such decisions, but were rather surprised by them. Furthermore, when people raised their voices calling for wisdom, family reunion and dialogue to get out of the crisis, these States warned their citizens against showing any sympathy with Qatar or criticizing the measures taken, and considered such behavior as a crime punishable by imprisonment or fine under the law.

On the other hand, Qatar contributed to several Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 to uphold the people’s demands. This perhaps was one of the primary causes for the dispute between Qatar and the blockading countries. Moreover, the Qatari Government also contributed to the Arab Spring single handedly, without the people’s participation given the absence of an elected Shura Council as stipulated in the Qatari Constitution.

1-1 ANALYSIS RESULTS:

Citizens were asked to respond to the following statement: “Political conflicts do not deteriorate rapidly when there is democratic participation through elected parliament in countries where conflicts arise”. The results indicate that 62% percentage of citizens believe that people’s participation through elected parliaments do not lead to rapid deterioration of political conflicts between countries where conflicts arose, compared to 17% who stated otherwise (Figure 1).
It should be noted that HH the Prince of Qatar recently declared, in his speech on the occasion of the opening of the forty-sixth session of the Shura Council, that the Qatari Government is currently preparing for the Shura Council elections, including the required draft legislative instruments that will be presented to the Council within the next year. HH the Prince also issued an Emiri Decree in 2016 to extend the Shura Council’s period until end of June 2019, and based on the foregoing, the call for elections may be expected in 2019.

On the other hand, Qatari citizens were asked about the importance of living in a democratic country; the same question was also asked before the Blockade in another survey. To answer the question, importance was rated based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important.

The results of the survey “Qatar Against the Blockade” indicate that 67% of Qatari believe in the importance of living in a democratic country by rating it 10 out of 10, which is twice the percentage of Qatari who believed in the importance of democracy in the survey conducted before the blockade (34%). This shows that the sense of importance of living in a democratic country among citizens doubled after the blockade compared to the previous few months. Figure (2) below clearly shows that 87% of
Qataris who believe in the importance of living in a democratic country in this survey by rating the importance level 7 and above, whereas only 4% of respondents do not believe in its importance by rating it below 4.

Figure 2: Importance of living in a democratic country

It should be noted that the Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar states in its Article I that the regime in the State of Qatar is democratic. This text should be construed with reference to other articles of the Constitution, which calls for respecting the laws and guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms that enshrine the State of law. The Constitution also anchors the State of institutions by highlighting the role of both the legislative and judicial powers in facing the executive power. Moreover, it confirms that the Qatari regime is based on the principle of separation of powers while maintaining cooperation between them. Therefore, the Constitution provided each of the three branches of power with instruments to monitor the other branch. In other words, the Shura Council monitors the work of government by raising question and inquiries and approving of the national budget. The executive power may dissolve the Shura Council and appoint some of its members. The judicial power - represented by the courts - may review and abolish decisions issued by the executive power. It may also monitor and challenge the constitutionality of laws issued by the legislative power and regulations issued by the executive power. All the above provisions consolidate the State of institutions. However in practice, the executive branch operates single handedly given the absence of the instruments previewed for the other branches to discharge their functions. For instance, there is no call so far for electing the Shura Council, and although the Law on

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1 Source of results before the blockade: SESRI - The Omnibus 2017 Survey.
establishing the Supreme Constitutional Court was promulgated in 2008, this Court did not exercise its powers actually. Furthermore, the Administrative Affairs Department, which decides on abolishing the government decisions, has restricted powers in accordance with the Law on the Settlement of Administrative Disputes.

1-2 SUMMARY:

Most Qataris believe in the importance of people’s participation through elected councils for the purpose of regional stability and non-exacerbation of political conflicts between States. Most of them also believe in the importance of living in a democratic country. Therefore, the State of institutions and law should be anchored.
2. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:
Qatar Blockade is one of the biggest challenges in Qatar history, as three neighboring States are exerting pressure on the country by various means to undermine the Qatari political autonomy. Although Qatar successfully overcame the political effects of the blockade, it is important to explore the Qatari trends and attitudes towards the blockade, the blockading countries and the ensuing regional dynamics.

2-1 ANALYSIS RESULTS:
First - The Political Interest:
As shown in figures (3) and (4), the results highlight the increasing citizens interest in political news, from only 50% to nearly 90%. This is normal amid daily repercussions of the crisis and fast-paced news, and if one reads such results in terms of the answer to a question about the most important issue in Qatar, they find that 78% of the citizens see that Qatar Blockade is the most important issue in the country, whereas the answer to the same question in a previous study included several issues, as 19% of the respondents chose “economic challenges”, 17% of them chose “congestion and transport”, and others chose other issues. Therefore, we can say that: The majority of Qatari expressed a high interest in following the updates and daily developments of the crisis, which means that the increasing political awareness of the Qatari people will undoubtedly affect the sociopolitical development in the State of Qatar.

Figure 3: Qatari interest in local and regional politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before Blockade</th>
<th>After Blockade</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Interested</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
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Second - Qatar’s GCC Membership:

This crisis resulted in numerous questions about the feasibility of GCC and Qatar's GCC membership; in light of such questions, the survey explored the attitude to Qatar’s GCC membership. The same question was asked back in 2010 in SESRI survey on the GCC single currency. At that time, 77% of respondents indicated that Qatar's participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council is positive, while 19% of them believed that it was neither positive nor negative, and only 4% of respondents believed it was negative. Nevertheless, the poor performance of GCC and GCC institutions during the crisis had limited impacts on Qatars’ attitudes, as the percentage of those who view Qatar’s participation in the GCC as positive decreased to 66%, the percentage of those who believe that it is neither positive nor negative increased to 26%, and the percentage of those who view it as negative increased to 8%. Such results indicate that the Qatari society is highly aware of the inevitable nature of the Gulf

\[2\] Source of results before the blockade: SESRI - The Omnibus 2012 Survey.
relationships, the importance of maintaining the regional ecosystem and the separation between the practices of the blockading countries and the quintessence of those relationships. Despite the seemingly low positive attitude towards the GCC, the majority of Qataris still believe that the system is positive despite the GCC poor performance during this crisis.

**Figure 5: Qataris’ perceptions of Qatar’s membership in GCC**

This crisis will undoubtedly have a great effect on the ecosystem of regional relationships in the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the region at large. Therefore, the survey carefully probed into Qataris’ attitudes towards the existing and expected alliances. The results in Figure (6) show that the majority Qataris (62%) believe that Qatar has to be completely independent of regional alliances, reflecting a state of discontent and lack of confidence in the regional environment. As a result, a larger percentage of Qataris (86%) agreed that Qatar needs to seek new alliances with regional powers, which also reflects the lack of confidence in the existing alliances. However, when asked whether Qatar should do what is necessary to recover normal relationships in the Gulf, Qataris expressed different viewpoints: Half of the respondents stated that they disagreed and therefore considered that the Qatari Government is not responsible for doing what is necessary to resolve the crisis. However, a significant percentage of Qataris (44%) advocated this viewpoint and
wished for the Qatari Government to do what is required to recover normal relationships; this is a natural result given the length of crisis and the psycho-social implications of the various violations of human rights which equally affect family ties and economic interests. In summary, these three results collectively indicate that the majority of Qatari recognize the necessity of forming new regional alliances whereby political decisions and foreign affairs are independent of regional pressures without compromising the Gulf ecosystem and the prospects of resolving the crisis.

**Figure 6: Qatari’s perceptions of regional alliances**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
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<td>Qatar should do what is necessary to return to normal relations in the GCC</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar should search for new alliances with regional powers</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar should achieve complete independence from regional alliances</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fourth - Qatar Soft Power:**

The Qatari media projects and Qatari support for fair issues in the Arab World were the main reasons for the blockading countries to justify the measures taken against Qatar. Therefore, the survey carefully probes into Qatari’s opinions of two models representing the media and regional stands in Qatar, namely Al Jazeera channel and Qatar support for Gaza.

The results in Figure (7) show that 79% of Qatari consider that Al Jazeera channel largely serves the Qatar interests, owing to its significant role in resisting to the media war led by the blockading countries against Qatar. However, these results also indicate a general acceptance of the official support for Al Jazeera network and trust in its pivotal role in serving Qatar interests. As for the support for Gaza, only 3% do not agree with the
continuous support for Gaza compared to 97% who stated that this support should continue. This shows that the citizens back the Government support for regional fair issues regardless of the neighboring States’ positions.

**Figure 7: Qatari’s perceptions of Qatar’s regional stands and its media projects**

Fifth - The Most Threatening and Biggest Ally Country:

In light of the threats against Qatar from the blockading countries, it was important to explore what is the State regarded by Qatari as the most threatening and biggest ally to Qatar. A previous survey conducted a few months prior to the crisis had asked about the State that represent the greatest threat. The results showed that, prior to the blockade, Iran was viewed as the greatest threat according to 35% of Qatari. This percentage decreased to 1% after the blockade. By contrast, UAE, which was absent in the previous survey results, was selected by more than 66% of Qatari after the blockade. It should be noted that KSA, which seemingly leads the blockading quartet, was the greatest threat to only 8% of Qatari. This may be due to the current media narratives which portrays the UAE as the architect of the Saudi hostility against Qatar. Furthermore, Abu Dhabi has played the primary role for many years on different issues, whereas the relationship with KSA has swung back and forth between positive and negative during the same period (Figure 8).
In the same context, and as shown in Figure (9), more than half of Qatari (55%) said that they still consider KSA to be the “elder sister” of Qatar although it leads the blockade efforts.

As for the biggest ally, Turkey ranked first as it was selected by 72% of Qatari, Kuwait was second with 16%. However, Oman, which was close to Qatar in its positions during this crisis, was selected by only 1% of

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3 Source of results before the blockade: SESRI - SESRI Comprehensive 2017 Survey.
citizens due to the Omani political behavior that refrains from declaring Omani positions in various crises and the limited focus on Oman in Qatari media (Figure 9).

**Figure 9: Qatari’s perceptions of the biggest ally country for the State of Qatar**

![Pie chart showing percentages of Qatari's perceptions of the biggest ally country for Qatar. Turkey: 12%, Kuwait: 16%, Other Countries: 72%.]

**Sixth - Government Performance and Blockade Continuation**

Finally, the results in Figure 10 below reveal the great popular support for the Qatari Government in its resistance to this blockade and Qatari’s preparedness in case of its continuation. 98% of Qatari said that they were satisfied with the Government performance during the crisis and 88% indicated that they believe that Qatar could go on for many years under this blockade in case it lasts.

![Pie chart showing percentages of Qatari’s agreement with the statement “KSA is the elder sister of Qatar.” Agree: 45%, Disagree: 55%.]
2-2 SUMMARY:

This section analyzes the political implications of the blockade crisis across 6 dimensions. The results revealed an increased interest among Qataris in the local and regional politics, great awareness of the inevitable nature of the Gulf relationships, the importance of maintaining the regional ecosystem and the separation between the practices of the blockading countries and the quintessence of those relationships. As for regional alliances, the results indicated that the majority of Qataris recognized the necessity of forming new regional alliances whereby political decisions and foreign affairs are independent of regional pressures without compromising the Gulf ecosystem and the prospects of resolving the crisis. Regarding Qatar’s soft power, the results show a general acceptance of the official support for Al Jazeera network and trust in its pivotal role in serving Qatar interests, in addition to the citizens’ backing of the Government support for regional fair issues regardless of the neighboring States’ positions.
In terms of Qatari perceptions of the States that pose a threat to Qatar, the results indicated that more than half of the citizens view the UAE as the greatest threat to the State of Qatar. They also showed a less severe position towards KSA in this crisis. This position may be associated with the cultural ties between many Qatari and Saudi tribes. However, the position is different towards UAE and could be due to the media rhetoric. Finally, the results showed a popular support for the Government in response to the crisis and Qatari satisfaction with the measures taken by the Government, in addition to their belief in the State’s ability to survive under the crisis.
3. THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS:
This section tackles the economic implications by analyzing the perception and attitudes of Qatari respondents towards the blockade, across three dimensions:
- The citizens’ perceptions of the business and commerce conditions and the State’s economy.
- The citizens’ attitudes towards entrepreneurship.
- The citizens’ attitudes towards the products of the blockading countries.
In general, the results show a positive impression among most respondents towards the business and commerce conditions in Qatar, and the expected economic performance in the future. Furthermore, Qataris’ expectations and perceptions of these economic indicators have improved, compared to the survey conducted prior to the blockade (January 2016)\(^4\); this shows a sense of confidence among Qataris in the economy owing to the measures taken by the Government in dealing with the blockade crisis, noting that an economic growth by 3.2% is expected in 2018\(^5\).

3-1 ANALYSIS RESULTS:
The results show that the majority of Qataris (more than 80%) have positive perception of the economy. This may be due to their positive impression towards the current business and commerce conditions, especially that Qataris did not feel confused in the local market owing to the efficient and effective government measures in dealing with the blockade. Additionally, citizens’ perceptions improved towards such indicators, compared to the results of a pre-blockade survey conducted in January 2016. The latter showed a positive perception of the current business and commerce conditions according to nearly half of the citizens (55%), whereas this percentage increased after the blockade to reach 84% (Figure 11). Furthermore, Qataris’ positive expectations for the future business and commerce conditions also improved from 72% prior to the blockade to 96% after it (Figure 11).

\(^4\) SESRI - Semi-annual Qatar Survey - January 2016.
Similarly, citizens’ expectations of the future economic performance of Qatar improved, as 99% of Qataris expected an economic growth over the next three years, compared to 83% before the blockade; and while 13% of citizens expected an economic recession prior to the blockade, this percentage further declined to only 1% after the blockade. As for the household’s financial situation, positive expectations increased from 70% before the blockade to 87% after it, and no negative expectations of the household’s financial situation were recorded, compared to 4% before the crisis (Figure 12).
The results show that 39% of citizens have investments in Qatar and 12% have investments in the blockading countries. When asked about the damage caused by the blockade to their investments, 3 out of 10 respondents who have investments in Qatar confirmed that their investments were damaged, compared to 8 out of 10 respondents who
have investments in the blockading countries (Figure 13). This damage is caused by the measures taken by the blockading countries to ban Qatari citizens from entering their territories, which prevented them from monitoring, managing and disposing of their investments.

**Figure 13: Citizens’ Investments in Qatar and the Blockading Countries**

The citizens were asked about their attitudes towards entrepreneurship and how they perceive the availability of investment opportunities. The results show that 77% of citizens confirmed the availability of investment opportunities in Qatar, but only 30% benefited from such opportunities (Figure 14).
When considering the interest in entrepreneurship and its relation to the whether or not the person has any investments at stake, the results show that the majority of respondents who have investments (i.e. 47%) exhibit serious interest more than others in starting a business venture (Figure 15). Moreover, it appears that the positive impression of the economy and the business conditions played a role in encouraging around 25% of the citizens with no investments to seriously consider starting a business venture.
Figure 15: Interest in Entrepreneurship According to Availability of Investments with the Respondent

The below figures showcase the citizens’ perceptions of the products quality, prices and availability in the local market. The results show discrepancies in the citizens’ perception of prices, as around one third of citizens (31%) said that prices were not high, compared to 27% stating they were. 33% of respondents said that the prices some products were high, others were not. Regarding the quality and availability of products, the majority of citizens highlighted the high quality and full availability of products in the market (88% and 71% respectively) (Figure 17).
Regarding the citizens’ attitudes towards the blockading countries products, the results show that the majority of citizens took a stand against the blockading countries’ products; 82% of citizens decided not to buy products from the blockading countries, and 71% of those citizens said they were unwilling to buy products from the blockading countries in the future (Figure 17).
**Figure 17: Citizens’ attitudes towards the blockading countries’ products**

![Chart showing citizens' aversion to buying products from blockading countries with 18% willing to buy and 82% unwilling to buy or use it again.]

![Chart showing citizens' willingness to buy products from blockading countries in the future with 23% willing, 71% unwilling, and 6% will not buy/use it again.]

### 3-2 SUMMARY:

The results indicate a positive impression among citizens towards the local market currently and Qatar economic performance in the future, and an improvement in citizens' perceptions and expectations in all economic indicators compared to the results of a previous survey conducted prior to the blockade. Additionally, the majority of citizens (77%) are aware of the investment opportunities available in the local market, which drives the citizens’ interest in entrepreneurship (34%).

On the other hand, the results show the citizens’ behavior towards the blockading countries’ products, as they are unwilling to buy or use products originated in the blockading countries. This could be the result of their belief that the economic conditions are favorable and business in Qatar will provide the substitute for the blockading countries’ products.

The citizens’ interest in entrepreneurship and unwillingness to buy products from the blockading countries strengthen the acceptance of the local products among citizens. Therefore, there is a need to intensify the efforts deployed by the State to promote entrepreneurship and enhance local investments.
4. THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS:

This section deals with the social dimensions of the blockade against Qatar. Contrary to the several political crises between the Gulf States in the past, this crisis involves for the first time the social dimension and imposes constraints on communication between the Gulf citizens who have shared social and kinship ties throughout history. Communication among relatives and family members used to be easy, however the current crisis caused by the blockading countries implicated the social dimension and imposed restrictive laws and obstacles to communication thus cutting kinship ties. Therefore, this section addresses the social dimension of the issue, as it probes into the nature of relationships and communication between relatives and family members in the Gulf States and also examines the crisis implication on those relationships and the social fabric in the Gulf.

4-1 ANALYSIS RESULTS:

Three quarters (75%) of the citizens have relatives in the blockading countries, which highlights the depth of the social ties and relationships among Gulf nationals and how far back they go in history. In addition, there are social, religious, linguistic and kinship ties that come on the scene among the Gulf Arab nationals (Figure 18).

Figure 18: Citizens Who Have Relatives in the Blockading Countries

When asked whether the citizens were able to meet with their relatives residing in the blockading countries during the crisis, 30% of citizens stated that they were able to see their relatives in the blockading
countries, whereas 70% of citizens said that attempts to meet with their relatives in those countries were unsuccessful. This means that the restrictions imposed by the blockading countries on their nationals and the Qatari citizens have impacted the network of social ties, especially that the blockade crisis caused the disintegration of Gulf families and contributed to weakening the cohesion among local communities and Qatari-Gulf families. Additionally, 69% of the citizens confirmed that they have met their relatives from the blockading countries in Qatar. This high percentage shows that Qatar still welcomes the citizens of the blockading countries and did not go down the same path as those countries, despite the measures they imposed on it. By contrast, 17% stated that were able to meet their relatives in any of the blockading countries. As for the persons who preferred to go to a non-blockading country to meet their relatives, those account for 14% of the citizens (Figure 19).

**Figure 19: Citizens’ Responses to the Possibility and Location of Meeting their Relatives from the Blockading Countries**

![Figure 19](image)

Figure (20) below shows that around three quarters of the citizens refuse to visit the blockading countries for tourism purposes after the end of the crisis; the majority said they strongly refused such potential visit. The reason behind such results could be the Qatariis’ awareness of the current situation and their stand in solidarity with the State against the blockade; another reason could be because they do not feel safe when visiting those
countries and expressing concerns about harassments they may face. Moreover, some respondents might consider that the crisis and its implications will mark the memory and will not be easily forgotten. By contrast, 27% of respondents said they are willing to visit the blockading countries after the end of the crisis.

**Figure 20: Citizens’ Willingness to Travel to Blockading Countries for Tourism after the Blockade Ends**

![Pie chart showing 73% approve and 27% disapprove](image_url)

Figure (21) below shows that the majority of citizens communicated with their family members and relatives in the blockading countries through phone calls and social media, while 11% of citizens said that they had not communicated with their families in the blockading countries at all. Although 11% is not a high percentage but it shows to which extent the current political situation has impacted the social ties. Reasons of communication rupture between the families is due to the reluctance of the persons residing in the blockading countries to communicated with their families either because they are afraid of their leaders or because of the difference in viewpoints regarding the situation in the Gulf region, which heightened the tensions between the relatives. The citizens’ responses as to the communication means are divided between social media, SMS messaging and visiting friends and relatives. Furthermore, 47% of citizens said that their relationship with their relatives in the blockading countries has not changed, which indicates that there are still people who separate politics and loyalty to the State from social ties. On the other hand, around one quarter of citizens (26%) said that their relationship with their relatives in the blockading countries has worsened due to the series of measures taken by the blockading countries against Qatar, in addition to the hostile rhetoric in the media.
which adversely affected kinship ties between Gulf nationals and led to the rupture of all social ties that once brought nations together. This rhetoric had a role in deteriorating the social fabric and troubling relations. On the other hand, the figure below show that 22% indicate an improvement in the relationship between Qataris and their relatives residing in the blockading countries.

**Figure 21: Citizen’s relationship with their relatives in the blockading countries**

47%

- Better

26%

- About the same

22%

- Worse

5%

- Mixed: some become better, some worse

4-2 SUMMARY:

The results show negative social implications on the citizens, as the majority (70%) were unable to meet with their relatives; in addition to that, one quarter of citizens indicated that their relationship with their relatives deteriorated due to the crisis and the majority expressed their unwillingness to visit the blockading countries in the future.
5. IMPLICATIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
Given the major role played during the blockade by Qatari and non-Qatari residents who have lived in Qatar for decades, activating and relying on such local talents have become essential and not a luxury. Therefore, this section aims to provide recommendations to maximize on the human resources of the State institutions in Qatar, so as to ensure the following:
  1. Sustainability.
  2. Effectiveness.
  3. Strategically develop new expertise and talents.

5-1 ANALYSIS RESULTS:
First: Develop and Unlock National Potentials in the Labor Market:

Human development in the State of Qatar was based on two main pillars over the last 15 years, namely: 1) the expansionary diversification policy of educational opportunities, and 2) the Qatarization policies. The assessment of the current situation reveals the following:
The Qatarization policy did not achieve the set targets for several reasons, namely: (1) The targets sets were unrealistic given the small share of Qatari of the labor market and the ongoing population growth resulting from the expansive projects. (2) The policy focused on quantity at the detriment of quality, which created a sort of disguised unemployment.

In return, the diversification policy of education opportunities proved to be successful in qualifying a new generation of Qatari and non-Qatari residents who’ve live in the country for decades and availed themselves of the educational opportunities.
The gap is not between the educational outcomes and the labor market needs; it is rather a gap in graduates’ integration and empowerment post employment, as many new recruits turn into underutilized labor force; i.e. they work and produce but their potential is not maximized. McKinsey

6 Public policies involve two types of tools, the incentives and restrictions. The diversification of educational opportunities is considered as incentives, whereas the quota system represents a restriction.
survey\(^7\) shows that only 27\% of university degree holders in USA in 2010 worked in fields related to their degrees; this means that this workforce gained the real experience at the workplace and not the university, which highlights the importance of effective empowerment and integration at the workplace.

Many organizations have launched relevant policies and initiatives but they soon changed or disappeared such as the Gas and Oil Sector Qatarization Committee and post-graduate scholarship programs to best-in-class international universities such as a program by Qatar Foundation which lacked a clear plan to integrate graduates.

**Second - Sustainable Attracting of Expertise and Qualified Workers**

External consulting contracts have become core models adopted by many of the State’s institutions for reasons including:
- Quick access to readily available expertise.
- Most institutions had to reduce their personnel budgets in the relevant budget line, whereas consulting contract budget lines are usually more flexible. Therefore, organization recruit consultants to maneuver this problem and compensate for the staff shortage. Thus, what is saved in the personnel budget line is actually spent in the consulting contract budget line.

Although this model which is mainly based on external consulting contracts has many pros, it also involves significant cons such as (1) the loss of institutional memory and knowledge accumulation, since expertise is lost when consultants are gone. (2) the transition to readily-available and more experienced alternative instead of sustainably developing the new generation experiences in-house. (3) lack of accountability as liability for the work is undermined or lost when the consultant is changed or when the contract is terminated. By contrast, permanent employees fear the consequences of long-term decisions.

The results to SESRI questionnaire show that 84\% of surveyed Qatari employees positively view the consultants’ experiences and skills. Nevertheless, 90\% of them believed in attracting talents permanently to their organizations to get along without consulting firms, and 91\% agreed

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that the existing experiences may do the job of consultants and consultancy firms (Figure 22).

**Figure 22: Citizens who agree with statements about engaging consulting firms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consulting companies and temporary consultants have the skills and experience to perform the job</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms's employee can perform the job of consultants and consulting companies</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent attracting more experienced and qualified staff helps the organization dispense with consulting</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, the results show that 69% of working citizens did not change their jobs and that average job tenure for males is 14 years, compared to 10 years for females. This reflects continuity in the workplace for Qataris (Figure 23).

**Figure 23: Number of Times of Changing the Job**

- Did not change their jobs: 69%
- Once: 12%
- Twice: 8%
- 3 times and more: 11%
Figure (24) below shows the citizens’ breakdown according to employment status; 58% are working citizens, 13% are students, 12% are retirees and 5% are jobseekers. When comparing male and female percentages, results show that 73% of workers are males and 45% are females; 15% of retirees are male and 8% are females. As for students, males accounted for 7%, compared to 18% of females, noting that this sample does not include students on scholarship abroad.
When looking at the breakdown of citizens working as full timers, part timers or freelancers, the results show that 60% of them are males and 40% females. As for the workers’ educational level, 43% of the surveyed working citizens hold bachelor's degrees, 32% of them hold high/secondary school certificates, and 10% attained an educational level below secondary (Figure 25).
Figure 25: Breakdown of employed citizens by gender and educational level
5-2 SUMMARY:

This section discusses the importance of developing the human capabilities in the labor market, particularly at the local level, by focusing on developing and unlocking national potentials and sustainably attracting expertise and talents. The analysis showed that the Qatarization policy was unsuccessful for several reasons, including setting unrealistic targets as to the percentage of Qataris in the labor market. In return, the same analysis pointed out the success of the diversification policy of educational opportunities in developing a new generation of qualified working Qataris. As for sustainable attraction of expertise and talents, the analysis pointed out the cons of engaging consulting firms to work with the State institutions, and the results highlighted the citizens’ attitudes to this matter.
CONCLUSION:
This survey discussed the results of analyzing the blockade implications on Qataris, across the legal, economic, social and political dimensions of the crisis. It also outlines the crisis implications on human development, the most important resource to build the country. The survey finally provided a series of recommendations in every dimension; in the legal dimension, it concluded that Qataris are aware of the importance of participating in public life and living in a democratic country. In this respect, the survey recommended that the Constitution is enforced by calling for the election of the Shura Council, and the enforcement of the Law on establishing the Supreme Constitutional Court and amendment of the Law on the Settlement of Administrative Disputes to expand the powers of the Administrative Affairs Department in courts.

Politically, results showed significant popular support for the Qatari Government against this blockade and citizens’ preparedness in case of its continuation. In this regard, the survey recommended that the role of the Government Communications Office is activated by issuing daily or weekly reports on the blockade updates. It also recommended that Qatar carries on with its official stand regarding maintaining its membership in the GCC, seeks to form alternative alliances, promotes the role of Al Jazeera channel in resisting the blockade and carries on its support for fair issues, such as Gaza.

At the economic level, the survey concluded that there was a positive impression among citizens towards Qatar’s economic performance. Additionally, the crisis challenges and the ensuing measures taken by the Government resulted in a positive reaction among citizens particularly when it comes to taking interest in entrepreneurship and establishing national companies. The survey also recommended encouraging local investment and further strengthen the entrepreneurship sector.

At the social level, the survey highlighted the negative social impacts on citizens in terms of communication breakup with family members and relatives in the blockading countries. It also recommended developing strict laws on marrying non-Qataris, even if they are GCC nationals, and training family and social workers in dealing with family issues in time of crisis.

Finally, at the level of human development, the survey highlighted the importance of moving from Qatarization to better qualifying Qatari employees in quality employments. In addition to that, the survey also
discussed the pros and cons of engaging consulting firms from the citizens’ perspective, and stressed the importance of unlocking national potentials in the labor market.

**METHODOLOGY OF SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION:**

The Blockade survey is conducted by cellular phone in Nov 2017. The target population for the survey includes adult Qataris (who are 18 years or older) currently living in Qatar. To reach this population, SESRI works with local cell phone providers to develop a cell phone sample using the listed dialing technique. As the proportion of adult Qataris with a cellular phone is about 98 percent, a sample drawn from this type of frame is expected to have excellent coverage and representation of the target population. The phone numbers in the sample are released for interviewing in batches to ensure that the complete call procedures are followed for all numbers. The use of batches also improves the representativeness of the survey by balancing the distribution of phone numbers across respondent characteristics.

For every phone number in the sample, there are at least seven attempts to complete the interview. The phone calls are made over different times during the day and different days of the week to maximize the chances of making contact with respondents. For phone numbers with break-off and soft refusal, dedicated interviewers would try to contact and convert them to completed interviews. The following table shows the disposition of all dialed phone numbers during this survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td>3700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>2460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown eligibility</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw response rate (RR1)</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted response rate (RR2)</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Calling dispositions*

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*8 This number is based on the face to face survey conducted by SESRI in 2017.*
On the basis of Table 1, response rates are calculated. We report two response rates in the last two rows of the Table. First, the raw response rate is the ratio between the number of completes or partials and total sample sizes after excluding ineligibles: $RR1 = \frac{C}{C+E+UE}$ where $C$ is the number of completes or partials, $E$ is the number of eligible responses, and $UE$ is the number of unknown eligibility. Second, the adjusted response rate is $RR2 = \frac{C}{C+E+eUE}$ where $e$ is the estimated proportion of eligibilities which is given by this expression $e = \frac{C+E}{C+E+IE}$ where $IE$ is the number of ineligibles.

With the numbers of completes and partials presented in Table 1, the maximum sampling error for a percentage is +/- 3.4 percentage points. The calculation of this sampling error takes into account the design effects (i.e., the effects from weighting and stratification). One possible interpretation of sampling errors is: if the survey is conducted 100 times using the exact same procedure, the sampling errors would include the "true value" in 95 out of the 100 surveys. Note that the sampling errors can be calculated in this survey since the sample is based on a sampling scheme with known probabilities.